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I. INTRODUCTION
Both legislative and judicial activity in the property area have been
prolific during the past biennium.' During the period covered by this
survey, some of the noteworthy legislative enactments included: the adop-
tion of condominium and cooperative buyer protection statutes; 2 the
creation of a uniform judicial sales procedure;' changes in the usury laws;4
and new procedures for the conveyance of partnership realty.5 Litigation,
as usual, covered all principal areas of property law with some of the
more notable decisions involving usury,6 an alimony judgment and home-
stead immunity,7 the duty, if any, of a cotenant in exclusive possession to
account for rents and profits,8 and the effect of a donative conditional
delivery of a deed.
Because of the large number of legislative and judicial pronounce-
ments, this survey represents a selection of the most noteworthy and sig-
nificant developments. A recounting of well established principles in
Florida is generally excluded.
II. MORTGAGES
A. Foreclosures
A suit upon a note secured by a mortgage has been held not to dis-
charge the indorser of the note. In Lisbon Holding & Investment Co. v.
Village Apartments, Inc.,'° the defense contended that the legal effect of
1. The period covered is the 1969-71 biennium, or more specifically, from volume 226
through 249 of the Southern Reporter, Second Series.
2. See section X infra.
3. See section II infra.
4. See section II infra.
5. See section III infra.
6. See section II infra.
7. See section III infra.
8. See section III infra.
9. See section VIII infra.
10. 237 So.2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. dismissed, 241 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1970).
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the suit was an election not to foreclose the mortgage and, therefore, a
waiver of the security which discharged the indorser. In rejecting the
defense, the court pointed out that in Florida, and generally, a suit on the
note does not constitute an election of remedies barring a subsequent
foreclosure action. Therefore, since the security was not waived, the in-
dorser was not released.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in two separate cases,"
held that a mortgagee may not foreclose his mortgage when his security has
not been placed in jeopardy. In Schechtman v. Grobbel,12 the mortgagors
paid escrow tax monies to a bank instead of to the mortgagee. The court
ruled that this was merely a technical breach of the mortgage contract and
did not place the security in jeopardy. Similarly, in Clark v. Lachenmeier,3
the same court held that the mortgagor's failure to obtain the consent of
the mortgagee when the property was sold did not impair the security of
the indebtedness. Consequently, the foreclosure complaint was dismissed.
Another case arose where a single indebtedness was secured by two
separate mortgages on two different parcels of land, one located in North
Carolina and the other in Florida. After foreclosing the mortgage on the
North Carolina realty, the mortgagee sought to foreclose the second
mortgage which was on Florida realty. The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that the acquisition of a deficiency judgment on the
first mortgage in North Carolina was not a prerequisite to filing the second
foreclosure suit in Florida. 4 However, evidence was admissible to de-
termine the true value of the North Carolina property so that an ap-
propriate credit could be used in the Florida suit.
A mortgagor's willingness to pay all delinquent amounts to make
his mortgage current does not entitle him to have a foreclosure action
dismissed.' 5 Furthermore, a mortgagor, even of homestead property,
may be estopped to deny the validity of the mortgage or the proper ex-
ecution thereof, especially if the mortgage has followed the note into
the hands of a holder in due course. This was the situation in Harris v.
Dikman,6 where the mortgagors claimed homestead protection and
also alleged that the two subscribing witnesses had not been present at
the execution of the mortgage instrument. In rendering its decision, the
court did not rely on the principle that a mortgage follows the debt, but
instead predicated the decision on the proposition that a bona fide assignee
of a note and mortgage who is without notice of any latent defect should
11. Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970); Schechtman v. Grobbel,
226 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
12. 226 So.2d I (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
13. 237 So.2d 583 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
14. Symon v. Charleston Capital Corp., 242 So.2d 765 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). The North
Carolina property was sold at public sale without any judicial proceedings as is permitted
under the laws of North Carolina.
15. Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970). The mortgagor must have
notice that the mortgagee has elected to declare the entire indebtedness due.
16. 235 So.2d 529 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1970).
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be protected against the mortgagor whose conduct caused the situation.
The result is justified since the mortgagors got what they bargained for.
However, it may be a little difficult to accept the homestead character of
the mortgage transactions in the first instance. The court noted that
prior to the execution of the mortgage the realty in question was a vacant
lot, and that the mortgage had been given to secure the construction of a
house. The court simply stated that the trial judge resolved all home-
stead issues in favor of the mortgagors, including the fact that the wife
was the head of the family. If, however, homestead status is predicated
upon at least two persons living on the land in a family relationship,'17
then this holding is a bit difficult to understand.
B. Usury
Since Holland v. Gross,'" a long line of cases have dealt with the
situation where a lender requires his borrower to incorporate so that
higher rates of interest may be exacted.' 9 It has constantly been recog-
nized that the facts in each case will determine whether the court will
find that a loan was made to individuals and not a corporation. In Tel
Service Co. v. General Capital Corp.,0 the supreme court held that
testimony establishing that the lender required the borrower to change
its form from a partnership to a corporation, without more, was not
sufficient to constitute the basis for disregarding the corporate entity.
Recent changes in the usury statutes have contributed to the prob-
lems of proper interpretation and application of the statutes. Thus, in
Tel Service,2 one statute, Florida Statutes section 687.07 (1963),22
had provided for forfeiture of both principle and interest where there
occurred an intentional charge of more than 25 percent interest per year.
In addition, later-enacted Florida Statutes section 687.11 (1965)23
provided that all interest would be forfeited if a corporation were charged
at a rate in excess of 15 percent each year. There were also provisions in
Florida Statutes section 687.04 (1965) allowing for forfeiture of double
the interest paid in case of charges to corporations in excess of 15 per-
cent per annum. The supreme court concluded that Florida Statutes
section 687.11 (1965) impliedly repealed prior inconsistent statutory
provisions that would impose greater penalties than forfeiture of the
interest 4 and also expressly agreed with the appellate court that legisla-
tion enacted in 1969 providing for the repeal of Florida Statutes section
17. See 1 R. BOYER, Florida Real Estate Transactions § 2301[1], at 474.6 (1969).
18. 89 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1956).
19. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1969) provides that a rate of interest greater than ten per-
cent per annum charged to an individual shall be usurious and unlawful, whereas the same
transaction with a corporation may exact yearly interest payments up to fifteen percent.
20. 227 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Tel Service].
21. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
22. Added by Fla. Laws 1909, ch. 5960, § 5; repealed by Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135.
23. Fla. Laws 1965, ch. 65-299, creating FLA. STAT. § 687.11 (1965).
24. See Tel Service Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1969).
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687.07 (1967)2" would be applicable to existing litigation.26 The court
noted that an action predicated on remedies provided by the usury stat-
ute created no vested substantive right, but only an enforceable penalty.
Accordingly, such penalty or forfeiture was held to possess no immunity
against statutory repeal or modification." This would appear especially
true in situations, as in the instant case, where the modifications favored
the wrongdoer as a result of a penalty reduction.
The case of Fields v. Wilensky28 involved a suit by a lender against
a guarantor of a corporation's note and dealt with a further modifica-
tion of the usury laws. This time, however, the court was faced with
an added twist. In Tel Service,29 the supreme court had held that Florida
Statutes section 687.11 (1965) impliedly repealed provisions of Florida
Statutes section 687.07 (1963), thus permitting only a forfeiture of
interest, rather than interest and principal, when usurious interest rates
were levied, even though section 687.11 (1965) had not been in effect at
the time that the action had been commenced. Thus, a penalty reduction
was effected. In Fields, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
was faced with the application of another later-enacted statute, Florida
Statutes section 687.071(7) (1969).3 0 That statute provided criminal
penalties for usury, but also provided that neither the principal nor in-
terest on a loan would be enforceable in the courts of Florida if the
interest levy was in excess of 25 percent.8 ' The court ruled that this
provision conflicted with section 687.11 (1969) [originally enacted in
1965] and that portions of the latter statute had been impliedly over-
ruled by the enactment of section 687.071 (7).2 Thus, the application of
the later-enacted statute in this case would lead to the increase in a
penalty, rather than a decrease as in Tel Service. Analogizing their hold-
ing to the rationale employed by the supreme court in Tel Service, the
Fourth District held that just as there was no vested right in a penalty
so as to require a lender to forfeit both interest and principal on a loan
after legislation had been enacted to lessen the penalty,3 that same rea-
soning could lead to no other conclusion but that a lender would also
be liable for any stiffer penalty set by the legislature. The court so held
and declared the debt to be completely unenforceable, but did certify
the question to the supreme court as presenting a matter of great public
concern. 
3 4
25. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135.
26. Tel Service Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So.2d 667, 669 (Fla. 1969).
27. Id. at 671.
28. 247 So.2d 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
29. Tel Service Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1969). See notes 20-
21 supra and accompanying text.
30. FLA. STAT. § 687.071 (1969), created by Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-135.
31. FLA. STAT. § 687.071(7) (1969).
32. Fields v. Wilensky, 247 So.2d 477, 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
33. Tel Service Co. v. General Capital Corp., 227 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1969). See notes 20-
21 supra and accompanying text.
34. The court also emphasized that in this case the provisions in effect at the time of
execution (FLA. STAT. § 687.07 (1964)) provided for forfeiture of both principal and in-
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The question of what will be considered as interest in determining
if a loan is usurious was dealt with in Curtiss National Bank v. Solomon. 5
In that case the plaintiff agreed to pay the debt of another, for which he
was not obligated, but which was due the lender in order to obtain an
extension on plaintiff's own loan. The court held that this payment by the
plaintiff should be classified as interest under the broad language of the
usury statute involved, Florida Statutes section 687.03 (1969).
C. Title Insurance and Mortgagees
After losing its attempt to foreclose on a mortgage which secured
a forged note, a plaintiff-mortgagee instituted suit against three insurance
companies to recover its loss. The supreme court ruled in that case,
Bank of Miami Beach v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 6 that a
defect in the note was not a defect in the mortgage securing the indebt-
edness. 7 Therefore, the insurance companies would not be liable under
the title policy issued. The insurance contract guaranteed that the mort-
gage constituted a valid mortgage on the property described therein
and was silent with respect to the note. The court stated that a "mortgage
lien and a mortgage debt are two entirely different legal concepts or
'species'."3 Therefore, the defect in the note did not come within the
coverage of the policy.
In Miller v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co., 9 the mortgagee,
upon learning that the mortgagors did not own the land described in the
mortgage, immediately filed suit against the title insurance company.
The court held that a title insurance contract obligated the insurer to
defend the title against a claim of its validity and that even though liabil-
ity was established,4° damages should be fixed at zero. The mortgagee
should have brought an action against the mortgagors, rather than di-
rectly against the insurer.
D. Balloon Mortgages
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the constitutionality of the
Balloon Mortgage Statute4 in the case of Winner v. Westwood.42 The
terest. "The fact that between the time of its execution and the time of its enforcement
Chapter 65-299 reduced the forfeiture provisions relating to usurious promissory notes is
of little consequence . . . ." Fields v. Wilensky, 247 So.2d 477, 482 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
35. 243 So.2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
36. 239 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1970).
37. The defect involved here was a forgery of the signatures on the note by the son
of the mortgagors. The mortgage itself was not forged, but was legally and properly ex-
ecuted and was therefore valid. Furthermore, the son was held liable for all sums disbursed
as a result of the forged note.
38. Bank of Miami Beach v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 239 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla.
1970).
39. 248 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
40. The insurer admitted that it allowed the mortgagee to place a mortgage on property
which was not owned by the mortgagor.
41. FLA. STAT. § 697.05 (1969).
42. 237 So.2d 151 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Winner].
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court further stated in Winner that a second mortgage at the time of its
execution, which later became a first mortgage as a result of the satisfac-
tion of the original first mortgage, did not come within the exemptions
found in subsection 5 of the statute.43
E. Miscellaneous
The standard of proof necessary to establish that signatures on
mortgages and deeds are forgeries is by a preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence and not by clear and convincing evidence."
In Indian River Orange Groves, Inc. v. Dickinson,45 it was resolved
that documentary stamp taxes are due on a deed given in satisfaction of
a mortgage.46 The amount of the tax is based on the value of the debt
discharged which is presumed to be the face value of the debt.
F. Legislation
Chapter 71-5 of the 1971 Florida Session Laws provides for a uni-
form judicial sales procedure which eliminates those statutes which
provide for judicial sales in specific situations.47 That act provides for
other aspects of procedure including: 1) clarification that a person hav-
ing an equity of redemption may redeem the property at any time before
the sale, and 2) that the amount bid at the sale may be considered by
the court as one of the factors in determining a deficiency.
III. ESTATES AND RELATED INTERESTS
A. Homestead
1. LEGISLATION
The 1968 Florida Constitution made several significant changes in
homestead law including a new provision specifically authorizing the
homestead owner to transfer the title to an estate by the entirety.",
However, the question of whether it is necessary to have the grantee join
in an interspousal transfer of homestead property was not resolved by
the new constitution. The 1971 Legislature has attempted to solve this
question by amending Florida Statutes section 689.11(1) (1969) to
43. FLA. STAT. § 697.05(5) (1969) provides that the statute shall not apply to the
following: any first mortgage; any mortgage created for a term of more than five years;
and any mortgage whose periodic payments consist of interest only with the original
principal sum to be payable upon maturity.
44. Pate v. Mellen, 237 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970). Accord, Security Trust Co. v.
Calafonas, 68 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1953) in which the supreme court stated that all the law
requires is that the record contain substantial, competent evidence to support the finding
of forgery.
45. 238 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 240 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1970).
46. FLA. STAT. § 201.08 (1969).
47. Amending FLA. STAT. § 45.031 (1969); repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 702.02, 702.021,
713.26(2) (1969).
48. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968), discussed in Dresnick, Real Property Law, 1967-
69 Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 578, 580 (1970).
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include homestead property and allow both interspousal transfer and
transfer to an estate by the entirety without the joinder of the grantee
spouse.49 The statute, however, may be of doubtful constitutionality
since the constitution generally still requires joinder of both spouses in
a conveyance of homestead. 0 Perhaps a grantee spouse's acceptance
of the deed is equivalent to a joinder in the deed, perhaps reasonable
men would so conclude, and perhaps the requirement of the grantee spouse
signing the deed is a mere formality; but the homestead has always been
sacred in Florida, and the constitutional provision does not explicitly
exclude the joinder requirement in interspousal transfers.
2. CASE LAW
The respect for the sanctity of the homestead has been evident in
the reported cases covered by this biennium. In Daniels v. Katz,5 a
divorced husband placed a mortgage on his undivided one-half interest
in property on which his former wife and children were residing. The
property had been previously owned as an estate by the entirety. After
the divorce, the property retained its homestead status, and the court
held that the lien created by the former husband would not be enforce-
able on his one-half interest until such time as the homestead character
was lost.52
In accordance with the non-retroactive effect of the new constitu-
tion, the case of Moore v. Moore,53 involving a 1964 conveyance, was
decided under the old constitution. In Moore, a deed from the husband
to himself and his wife purporting to convey homestead property was
found to be void ab initio. 4 Presumably, the attempted conveyance was
void because it was gratuitous, because the grantee did not join as grantor,
or perhaps because of both reasons.
Bendl v. Bend 55 involved a very interesting fact pattern. In that
case, a first wife sued a second wife to enforce an unpaid judgment against
their common husband. The husband owned property with his first wife
as an estate by the entirety. After they were divorced, the husband took
up residence with his second wife on the property in which he now owned
an undivided one-half interest in common with his former wife. The
property attained a homestead status, and in 1968, after the new constitu-
tion was ratified, the husband and his second wife conveyed his interest
in the property to themselves as an estate by the entirety. In the mean-
time, the first wife recorded a final money judgment against the husband
49. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-54.
50. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (1968).
51. 237 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
52. Id.
53. 237 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
54. Of course, if the conveyance had taken place subsequent to the new constitution it
would have been good had the wife joined in the deed. See section III, B, 1, infra.
55. 246 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
1971]
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based on alimony. The husband died in 1969, and the court held that
during his lifetime the judgment was not a lien upon the property because
of the homestead status and the estate by the entirety.56 In addition,
when he died, his undivided one-half interest vested by operation of law
in the second wife and was not available to satisfy the judgment debts
of the husband individually.
57
B. Dower and the Ownership of Property by Married Women
1. LEGISLATION
The last survey of Florida property law58 explained that the new
constitution provides no distinction between married women and married
men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of property."
Since that time, the Florida Legislature has enacted a law6" clarifying
this constitutional provision and virtually making all married women free
dealers of non-homestead property.6' A married woman may now convey
her separate property without the joinder of her husband, and all such
conveyances since the effective date of the 1968 constitution are made
valid.
The time in which a widow must elect to take dower in property
which her husband conveyed during his lifetime without her joinder (or
relinquishment of dower) has been limited under new legislation.63 Now,
a widow must file an election to claim dower within three years after
her husband's death or her interest will be barred.
2. CASE LAW
In two cases involving a married woman dealing in real property,
without her husband's joinder, before the effective date of the new con-
stitution, the Supreme Court of Florida approved opposite results by
distinguishing two cases on their facts. In Zofnas v. Holwell,"4 the mar-
ried woman attempted to eject the defendant from the property she
conveyed. The court imposed the doctrine of estoppel to disallow the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 576-77. The court cited various authorities which stand for the proposition
that property held by the entirety does not pass by descent, but vests by operation of law
in the surviving spouse free from any liens against the deceased individually.
58. Dresnick, Real Property Law, 1967-69 Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MIAmi L.
REv. 578, 591 (1970).
59. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5 (1968).
60. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 694.04, 708.08-.09 (1969) ; repeal-
ing FLA. STAT. §§ 62.021, 633.01-.05, 633.13-.14, 708.01-.04, 708.06-07 (1969).
61. Apparently all distinctions between married men and women in the management
and control of their property have now been abolished by Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4.
62. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4, amending FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1969).
63. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-25, adding FLA. STAT. § 731.35(4). The effective date of the
act is January 1, 1972. However, it specifically states that the limitation shall apply even
though the decedent died prior to the effective date, with the exception that no dower
interests will be barred if the claim is filed prior to January 1, 1973.
64. 234 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
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action, even though her deed was void, due to nonjoinder of her husband.
However, in Bogle v. Perkins,6" the court held that the married woman's
execution of a contract for the sale of real property was unenforceable
against her under the old constitution. There was no question of estoppel
inasmuch as the parties agreed that there was no issue of material fact
involved.66
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that a wife's inchoate right of dower in her husband's lands
is extinguished when the lands are condemned under the right of eminent
domain. 67 The court chose to follow the weight of authority in the United
States,6" which is consistent with Florida statutory69 and case law.7°
In another case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, held in In Re Estate of Johnson71 that a Florida widow
has no right of dower in out-of-state property which was validly con-
veyed by her husband during his lifetime. In that case, a widow attempted
to obtain one-third of the value of Michigan land which was not part of
the probate assets. The court ruled that the county judges' court could
not consider the value of this land in calculating the widow's forced
share. Rather, the widow would have to go to the situs of the non-Flor-
ida land to determine if she had a dower interest.72 One judge dissented,
arguing that the law of the domicile, in this case, Florida, should have
governed in the determination of the widow's dower, and that it was
"contrary to law and good conscience" to allow the husband to divest
his wife of her distinct interest in property which she acquired as a mat-
ter of law.7a
C. Tenancies in Common
A tenancy in common results after the divorce of a couple holding
title to property by the entireties, and there are often problems in deter-
mining who it entitled to what. Coggan v. Coggan74 dealt with this situa-
tion with respect to both residential and rental properties. The supreme
court affirmed the lower court's holding75 which held that the husband
was not entitled to immediate possession nor present partition since the
wife had been granted exclusive possession of the residence by the final
65. 240 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1970).
66. Id. at 803.
67. Dal Brun v. City of West Palm Beach, 227 So.2d 347 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
68. Id. at 348.
69. FLA. STAT. § 731.34 (1969) provides that a widow shall be entitled to a one-third
fee simple interest in real property owned by her husband at the time of his death or which
he had conveyed before his death without the relinquishment of dower.
70. E.g., In re Hester's Estate, 158 Fla. 170, 28 So.2d 164 (1946), which held that a
sheriff's sale pursuant to an execution against the husband extinguishes dower.
71. 240 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
72. Id. at 841. It appears that the widow would have no dower right in the land ac-
cording to that state's law.
73. Id. at 844 (dissenting opinion).
74. 239 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
75. Coggan v. Coggan, 230 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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divorce decree. However, the court reversed the lower court's decision
to hold the husband liable to account for the rental value of the office
building which they held as tenants in common. 76 After the divorce, the
husband had continued in possession of the building and had used it as
his medical office. The court found that he was not holding adversely to
his ex-wife. Therefore, the case came within the general rule that an
occupying cotenant in exclusive possession is not liable in the absence
of an agreement to account to the other cotenants.
D. Adverse Possession
Section 96.16 of the Florida Statutes (1969) provides that one
may acquire title to property through adverse possession under color
of title. In order to meet the requirements of this section, the instru-
ment upon which the color of title is based must purport to convey the
land involved. In Armstrong Cork Co. v. Crook,77 the property involved
was a forty acre square bounded on the north by water. The court ruled
that even though the legal description was not very clear, if it was suf-
ficient to enable a surveyor to ascertain and locate the land, it may be
acceptable. In this case, the sufficiency of the description should have
been a question for the jury.7s
E. Boundaries
1. ACQUIESCENCE AND PAROL AGREEMENTS
Abutting property owners often invoke either the doctrine of bound-
ary by agreement or the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence79 to de-
termine disputes concerning common boundary lines. However, both of
these principles apply only where the boundary is uncertain or in dis-
pute." In King v. Carden,"l the abutting owners agreed to use a certain
fence as the dividing line between the two parcels of land. One of the
owners acquired the other parcel, and the titles merged. Subsequently,
this same owner conveyed one parcel to the plaintiff's assignor, describ-
ing the boundary line as a quarter section line and not the fence. The
court held82 that the previous undisclosed oral agreement was not binding
on the plaintiff and that since there was no dispute between him and
the owner, the boundary line in the deed should prevail.
76. Coggan v. Coggan, 239 So.2d 17, 19 (Fla. 1970).
77. 227 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
78. Id. at 66. The trial court had directed a verdict.
79. Three elements are necessary to prove boundary by agreement: 1) uncertainty or
dispute as to the true boundary; 2) an agreement that a certain line will be treated by the
parties as the true line; and 3) subsequent occupation by the parties in accordance with
that agreement. Boundary by acquiescence involves two elements: 1) a dispute; and 2)
continued occupation and acquiescence in a line other than the true boundary line. See
King v. Carden, 237 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
80. See generally 1 R. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 13.09 (1969).
81. 237 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
82. Id.
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2. PARTY WALLS AND IMPROVEMENTS ON THE WRONG LOT
In Esquire Estates, Inc. v. Krakow,8 ' the plaintiff attempted to en-
join the owner of adjacent property from demolishing a common wall on
the theory that it was a party wall. Evidence disclosed that the wall
was one inch inside the defendant's property line. The court ruled that
for a true party wall to exist it is usually necessary that both properties
have once been owned by one owner. 4 Since this was not the case there,
the injunction was lifted.
Jim Walter Corp. v. Bracht5 involved more than just a dispute over
a wall on the defendant's land. The plaintiff had built a house on the
wrong parcel of land and sought to have the defendant who had oc-
cupied the house vacate the premises so that it could be removed. It was
held that the plaintiff failed to prove his allegation that such construction
was the result of a mutual mistake. Hence, authorization to remove the
house was refused.8 6
F. Water Rights
1. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
In Silver Blue Lake Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home
Owners Association,87 the supreme court upheld the appellate court's
enforcement of a restrictive covenant limiting the use of a man-made
lake to members of a property owners association and denying such use
to apartment tenants whose apartment building abutted a small portion
of the lake.88 The court refused to answer the certified question as to
whether the tenant of a riparian artificial non-navigable lakebottom
owner derives the right through the owner to use the waters of the lake.
However, it did state as an abstract proposition that the right of the
owners of a portion of such a bed to rent their rights to use the water
surface to tenants of an apartment complex is only the right of lawful
and reasonable use not detrimental to other owners or lawful users, and
that such use may be held to be subordinate to valid deed restrictions.8 "
83. 249 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), noted in 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 768 (1971).
84. Id. at 505. The court also refused to find that a right to a party wall grew out of
a type of adverse possession. There was no proof that the plaintiff-user was open and obvi-
ous in his possession during a twenty-year period.
85. 239 So.2d 643 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
86. Compare with Voss v. Forgue, 84 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1956) ; Chavis v. Citizens Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n, 95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957). In both of these cases, the chancellor
ordered the parties to exchange lots because the lots had no peculiar or unique value. In
Chavis, there were houses on both lots, and the court, guided by equity, ruled that the
houses had the same value, and the lots were the same size. Therefore, an exchange was
thought to be the fairest resolution of the problem.
87. 245 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1971).
88. Silver Blue Lake Apts., Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass'n, 225 So.2d
557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). That decision is discussed in Dresnick, Real Property Law, 1967-69
Survey of Florida Laws, 24 U. MIAmi L. REV. 578, 588 (1970).
89. Silver Blue Lake Apartments v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass'n, 245 So.2d
609, 612 (Fla. 1970). Justice Drew, concurring in part and dissenting in part, upheld the
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2. SUBMERGED LANDS
The state of Florida held title to certain submerged lands by virtue
of its sovereignty. As a result of a hurricane, these lands suddenly be-
came dry. This sudden avulsion was held not to affect the status of the
title to the land, which was held to remain in the state; thus defeating
the claims of two adjoining property owners who were claiming the land. 0
G. Partnership and Limited Partnership Property
In 1970, the legislature attempted to clarify its position on the
conveyancing of property owned by a limited partnership." This at-
tempt proved incomplete, forcing the 1971 legislature to revise and ex-
pand the 1970 law to more clearly delineate a limited partnership's
powers relative to the acquisition of real propertyf 2 The new law defines
partnership property and states that it may be acquired and dealt with in
the partnership name. A conveyance, encumberance, or any other instru-
ment affecting title to real property shall be executed by one of the
general partners in the partnership name. Furthermore, inchoate dower
shall not exist, and spouses need not join in the execution of any instru-
ments affecting title.
A law almost identical to the one dealing with limited partnerships
was enacted by the 1971 legislature with respect to partnerships gener-
ally. " However, this statute contains an obvious problem which may well
have to be rectified by subsequent action. The law provides that instru-
ments affecting title to real property shall be executed in the partnership
name by at least one of the partners. Since a partnership is not re-
quired to file a certificate with the Secretary of State as is required in
the formation of a limited partnership,94 some procedure will have to be
set up to determine if the person executing the instrument actually is a
partner of the partnership.
H. Easements
In 1970, the legislature created a twenty year statute of limitations
on any easement given or reserved, including rights of entry, in any
conveyance or devise of real property for the purpose of mining, drilling,
decision on the basis of equitable servitudes. He then discussed the right of tenants of an
abutting owner to use the waters of a non-navigable lake. Chief Justice Ervin, dissenting,
discussed at length the question of navigability and the question of public versus private
character of the lake.
90. Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1970). The supreme court also affirmed the
rule that the plea of equitable estoppel is not available to establish title, but only to defend
apparent title.
91. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-301, amending FLA. STAT. § 620.03 (1969).
92. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-9, amending FLA. STAT. § 620.03(1) (Supp. 1970) ; repealing
FLA. STAT. § 620.03(2) (Supp. 1970); adding FLA. STAT. § 620.81(1)-(4). The effective date
of this enactment is January 1, 1972.
93. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-71. The effective date of this enactment is January 1, 1972.
94. FLA. STAT. § 620.02 (1969).
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exploring or developing. 5 The legislature also provided a method for
the owner of such property to file suit to eliminate these easements from
his title by means of a suit to quiet title in the circuit court. The limita-
tion applies only when proof is shown that such rights have not been
exercised within the twenty year period, and the period, itself, runs from
the recording of such conveyance or devise. There would seem to be no
doubt as to the validity of the statute's prospective operation, but a
constitutional question is immediately suggested as to its retrospective
application as it affects rights accruing prior to the effective date of the
act, October 1, 1970. Also, many mineral rights, for example, have been
reserved in favor of the state or one of its agencies. The statute does not
specifically apply to such rights created in favor of the state, and it is
possible that it could be construed to not apply to state-retained rights.
IV. LANDLORD AND TENANT
A. Lease Provisions
A lease provision forbidding a tenant from selling anything that
would compete with any other tenant within a neighborhood shopping
center was held to impose a reciprocal obligation on the landlord.96 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's reasoning that if the landlord
allowed a competing business to operate within the center, the tenant
would be considered in violation of his lease by continuing his own busi-
ness . 7 This would create an absurd result, and therefore, the injunction
against the landlord was determined to be reasonable.
Coastal Bay Golf Club, Inc. v. Holbein9 dealt with a lease clause
which gave the lessee a right of first refusal should the lessor receive a
bona fide offer from a third party to purchase the leased property. The
landlord brought a declaratory judgment action to determine if the lessee
complied with the first refusal provision. The court held that the lessee's
offer had not complied with the provision99 because it required a disposi-
tion of the property by a different method and under different conditions
than the third party's offer. In order for the lessee to have properly ex-
ercised his right, his offer had to have matched the existing offer; that is,
the essential terms of the offers had to have been identical.'00
In Tollius v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc.,"°' the lessee, in order to
assign his interest in the lease, was required to obtain written consent
95. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-100, adding FLA. STAT. § 704.05 (Supp. 1970).
96. White Star Realty Co. v. Schreiber, 229 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
97. Id. at 301.
98. 231 So.2d 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
99. Id. The court defines a right of first refusal as:
a right to elect to take specified property at the same price and on the same terms
and conditions as those continued in good faith offer by a third person if the owner
manifests a willingness to accept the offer.
Id. at 857.
100. Id. at 858.
101. 244 So.2d 467 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 247 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1971).
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
from the lessor. When the present lessees attempted to assign the motel
lease involved, the landlord accepted the assignment subject to satisfactory
evidence of the financial condition of the assignees. After much delay,
the lessor refused to approve the assignment. The court, however, held
this refusal to be arbitrary,10 2 since the lessor had based his refusal on
the failure of the assignee to supply assumption agreements and not be-
cause of any lack of financial responsibility on the part of the assignee.
The court stated that equity would not permit the landlord to cancel
this lease and reap the improvements on the property.' The court did
not, however, indicate whether the landlord might have been able to
recover his property had there been no improvements.
B. Requesting Tenant's Immediate Departure
Provisions of the Florida Statutes10 4 permit the notice requirements
due a tenant before eviction to be circumvented, circumvented in the case
of certain designated guests and "tenants," and immediate departure
effected in certain circumstances. In Kent v. Wood, °5 the tenant was
living under an oral month-to-month lease when the landlord notified
him that he was no longer desired as a guest. The court ruled that the
landlord's failure to demand that the tenant immediately depart and to
tender a refund of unearned rent constituted noncompliance with the
statutory requirements of Florida Statutes section 509.141 (1969), and
therefore necessitated notice0 6 before eviction could be effective. The
court pointed out that Florida Statutes section 509.141 (1969) was
created to provide for immediate ejection of guests whose conduct is
undesirable, but since it was penal in nature, exact compliance with the
statutory provisions was necessary, and the courts would strictly con-
strue the law.
1 7
C. Limitations on the Landlord after Eviction
Geiger Mutual Agency, Inc. v. Wright'0 8 presented a question of
first impression regarding acceleration of rents. There, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, was faced with a lessor who had elected
to accelerate the rental payments of a tenant who had breached his
lease after the lessor had re-entered the property and resumed posses-
sion.' Following the majority rule in the United States,'" the court
102. Id.
103. Id. at 472, 473. The property had a gross value of $950,000.00 and a net value
of approximately $500,000.00 as a result of the construction of a Holiday Inn Motel on
the property by the original lessees.
104. FLA. STAT. § 509.141 (1969).
105. 235 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
106. See FLA. STAT. § 83.03 (1969). Under that statute, fifteen days notice prior to the
end of any monthly period is required when there is a tenancy from month to month.
107. Kent v. Wood, 235 So.2d 60, 62-63 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
108. 233 So.2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Geiger].
109. There are three alternatives open to a landlord when a tenant breaches a lease
prior to its expiration:
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held that the right to recover the full rental of a leased property through
acceleration is lost upon re-entry by the lessor."' In a factually similar
case to Geiger, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, encountered
a lessor who had accelerated the rental payments of a lessee-assignor
who had refused to re-enter the leased property after the sublessee-as-
signee had departed the premises.112 The court held that any rents col-
lected as a result of reletting the premises had to be applied against the
amount due from the lessee to mitigate its liability for damages. In
Geiger, the court had refused to allow a landlord to take possession and
accelerate simultaneously. In Jimmy's Morningside, the Second District,
while allowing that a landlord has the right to re-enter and relet a prop-
erty when a tenant breaches his lease, held that the breaching tenant is
entitled to an accounting and a refund of any rents collected during the
affected term. Under either case a landlord is not entitled to a windfall
when a tenant defaults on a lease.
D. Miscellaneous
Whenever a landlord wrongfully breaches a lease by unlawfully
evicting the tenant, the landlord will be held liable for general damages.
In McCone v. Adams," 3 the District Court of Appeal, First District, re-
affirmed the general rule that the measure of these damages is the differ-
ence between the market value of the lease and the stipulated rent payable
therein.
G.M.A.C. Corp. v. Noni, Inc." 4 held that a chattel mortgage against
a liquor license was inferior to a prior landlord's lien. The court followed
the principle that a landlord's lien attaches either at the beginning of the
tenancy or when a chattel is brought onto the premises.",
In another case, a tenant was not estopped from asserting that an
unsigned five year lease came within the Statute of Frauds." 6 Since the
(a) he may treat the lease as terminated and resume possession of the premises,
thereafter using the same exclusively as his own for his own purposes; or
(b) he may retake possession of the premises for the account of the tenant,
holding the tenant in general damages for the difference between the rentals stipu-
lated to be paid and what, in good faith, the landlord is able to recover from a
reletting; or
(c) he may stand by and do nothing, and sue the lessee as each installment
of rent matures, or for the whole when it becomes due.
4 J. ADoKms, FLORmA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 106.04, at 1970 (1960), as
quoted in Jimmy Hall's Morningside, Inc. v. Blackburn & Peck Ent., 235 So.2d 344, 345
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). See also Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d 553, 557-58 (Fla. 1953); Geiger
Mutual Agency, Inc. v. Wright, 233 So.2d 444, 447 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
110. See, e.g., Pirkle & Williams v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, 19 La. App. 729, 140 So.
837 (1932); DeLong Hook & Eye Co. v. Tait, 108 Pa. Super. 369, 164 A. 848 (1933).
111. Geiger Mutual Agency, Inc. v. Wright, 233 So.2d 444, 447 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
112. Jimmy Hall's Morningside, Inc. v. Blackburn & Peck Ent., 235 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Jimmy's Morningside].
113. 239 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
114. 227 So.2d 891 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
115. Id.
116. Besco Electric Supply Co. v. Moses, 226 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969), cert. denied,
234 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1969).
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record showed that the parties did not operate under the terms of the
unsigned lease, the landlord was not entitled to enforce the lease which
was for a period longer than one year.
In Brownlee v. Sussman,"7 the landlord brought an action to re-
cover possession of the premises under the Delinquent Tenant Act,
118
and the tenant raised affirmative equitable defenses. The court rejected
these equitable defenses and held that the only defense cognizable under
the statute is payment of the rent due.
V. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Necessity of Taking
The Supreme Court of Florida decided three companion cases".9
involving condemnation proceedings in conjunction with the construc-
tion of the Cross Florida Barge Canal. The court held that a condemning
authority has the burden of establishing a reasonable necessity, as op-
posed to an absolute necessity, for condemnation. 20 Once reasonable
necessity is demonstrated, the landowner's only affirmative defense is
to show bad faith or gross abuse of discretion.' 21 In Canal Authority v.
Miller,22 the condemning authority initially obtained an easement
which, it conceded, would satisfy its needs. It then sought to acquire
a fee simple title, and the court denied it saying that no additional evi-
dence beyond that admitted to justify the easement was produced.' 2 '
Therefore, the condemning authority failed to fulfill its burden of estab-
lishing a necessity. On the other hand, in Canal Authority v. Litzel,
124
the court recognized that the condemning authority introduced adequate
reasons to establish a necessity. Although the facts in Litzel were similar
to those in Miller, and an easement might well have been adequate, the
Canal Authority in its discretion had initially elected to seek a fee simple
title. Consequently, its election was upheld since there had been no show-
ing of bad faith or abuse of discretion. 25
B. Procedure
In a recent case decided by the supreme court, it was held that a
trial judge is permitted to determine and grant attorney's fees in a con-
117. 238 So.2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
118. FLA. STAT. § 83.05 (1969).
119. Canal Authority v. Litzel, 243 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1970); Canal Authority v. Miller
and Canal Authority v. Hayman, 243 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1970) [both cases will be cited as
Canal Authority v. Miller for purposes of this survey].
120. Canal Authority v. Miller, 243 So.2d 131, 134 (Fla. 1970).
121. Id.
122. 243 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Miller].
123. The court stated that an acquiring authority will not be permitted to take a
greater interest than is necessary to serve the particular public use for which the property
is being acquired. Id. at 133.
124. 243 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Litzell.
125. Id. at 138.
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demnation proceeding in which the condemnor has filed a notice of dis-
missal where there has been no taking or appropriation. 126 Thus, an
apparent conflict with some prior decisions 127 was resolved when the court
explained that a statute12' enacted in 1963 had subsequently altered the
law. This legislation has removed the necessity of having a trial on the
merits and a separate trial to determine attorney's fees and has included
these fees as court costs. The supreme court recognized 129 that this hold-
ing was in accord with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure."'
In O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach,' 31 the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that when a condemnor has seized property
prior to final judgment," 2 a voluntary dismissal will not be allowed
without an order of the court. The reasoning advanced was that too many
matters such as title, compensation, deposit, and damages would be left in
limbo if the condemnor could unilaterally dismiss the proceedings. 3'
The City of Miami Beach attempted to file successive suits for
condemnation against the same property until it received a judgment
which it considered satisfactory. In City of Miami Beach v. Cummings,'34
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the city's failure
to deposit with the court the amount of compensation fixed by the jury
rendered the proceedings null and void. In addition, a subsequent proceed-
ing would not comply with the statutory requirements in that the resolu-
tion relied on by the city had also become null and void as a result of
the prior proceedings.
In a case surrounded by extensive controversy," 5 the Supreme Court
of Florida set a balance between the protection of the state's natural re-
sources and the completion of public works, both matters of public interest.
The court held that Florida Power and Light Co. was entitled to condemn
lands for the purpose of constructing a drainage canal prior to obtaining
approval of the project from various federal, state and local authorities. 36
Although ultimate approval was essential, the court felt that in the interim
the public interest was safeguarded since the utility had demonstrated that
1) there was a reasonable probability of obtaining approval; and 2) the
126. City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 236 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1970).
127. See DeSoto County v. Highsmith, 60 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1952) ; Jacksonville Terminal
Co. v. Blanshard, 77 Fla. 855, 82 So. 300 (1919).
128. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (1969).
129. City of Hallandale v. Chatlos, 236 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla. 1970).
130. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420.
131. 232 So.2d 33 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
132. FLA. STAT. ch. 74 (1969) provides a procedure in which a condemnor may take
possession and title in advance of final judgment.
133. O'Sullivan v. City of Deerfield Beach, 232 So.2d 33, 34-35 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
The court also explained that FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(a)(1), which allows for voluntary
dismissal without court order, does not encompass proceedings where property has been
seized.
134. 233 So.2d 845 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1970).
135. Seadade Industries, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1971).
136. Id.
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condemnation would not result in irreparable harm should the approvals
be denied.
C. Circumstances Entitling Compensation
The State Road Department coverted a road into a limited access
facility, and abutting property owners brought an action for damages for
loss of access. 8 The court held for the plaintiffs and pointed out that
access for ingress and egress is a right which must be protected.'89 In
another case, Pinellas County v. General Telephone Co.,140 the court held
that a franchise agreement gave the telephone company a property right
within the right-of-way of a dedicated alley which could not be taken away
without just compensation.
D. Miscellaneous
In Ragland v. State Department of Transportation,'4' the landowner
contended that his land should not be allowed to be bisected by a highway
because of ecological and environmental considerations. Although the
court sympathized with the pollution arguments, it was compelled to find
that the condemnation award was in substantial compliance with the
law. 42 However, the landowner was urged to direct his self-labelled "plea
for life" to the legislative and executive branches of the government.
Levit v. State Department of Transportation4 held that evidence
showing that a highway improvement would enhance the value of the
property remaining after a taking should be admitted and allowed to be set
off against severance damages.
The question of business damages versus severance damages was in-
volved in LeSuer v. State Road Department.'" There, the court ruled that
the cost of effecting physical changes or modifications necessitated by a
taking are severance damages. 45
VI. ZONING
A. Proper Classification
A landowner challenged the zoning of his property as single family
residential in the circuit court, and the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, affirmed the lower court ruling that the zoning was invalid. 46
137. Id. at 214-15.
138. State Road Dept. v. McCaffrey, 229 So.2d 668 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
139. Id. at 669. However, when reasonable access is furnished, such as a service road
in this case, the resulting damages may be nominal.
140. 229 So.2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
141. 242 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
142. Id. at 477.
143. 248 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
144. 231 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
145. Business damages usually involve the reduction of the profit-making capacity of
an enterprise.
146. Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 177 So.2d 355 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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The appellate court said that the highest and best use for the property
would be for hotels and apartments (R-4 zoning). The city then received
a new application and upon deliberation rezoned the property as R-3-A
instead of R-4. In subsequent litigation, the case reached the supreme
court which held that the city was not bound to classify the property as
the Second District had directed, i.e., R-4.147 The supreme court also ob-
served that in the interim the community had changed, and that the city,
after examining new evidence, had not abused its power by attaching a




When a county resolution creating a planned apartment district re-
sulted in the rezoning of land to multiple use, a landowner in a nearby
single family development challenged the reclassification. The court, in
Florida Palm-Aire Corp. v. Delvin,49 ruled that the rezoning ordinance
could not be attacked since the plaintiff had not shown special damages.
To successfully contest the validity of rezoning, according to the court,
one must demonstrate "special or irreparable damage differing in kind,
rather than in degree, from that sustained by the community as a
whole."
M 5 0
2. INVALIDATION OF ORDINANCES
There are many bases upon which a zoning ordinance may be found
invalid. For example, in Knowles v. Town of Kenneth City,151 the court
found that the ordinance was passed without the requisite public hearing
and was therefore invalid under the provisions of Florida Statutes section
176.05 (1969).152 In Florida Tallow Corp. v. Bryan,'53 a local law requir-
ing that any zoning changes be first submitted to the zoning commission
was held to be mandatory; therefore, the failure to do so constituted in-
validation of the ordinance. Finally, in City of Homestead v. Schild,54 a
special permit for a use contrary to zoning was invalidated on the basis
that the enabling ordinance authorizing the city council to grant special
use permits was void due to a lack of standards or guidelines which could
be followed.
147. Mayflower Property, Inc. v. Watson, 233 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1970).
148. Id. at 392.
149. 230 So.2d 26 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. discharged, 234 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1970).
Certiorari was discharged by the supreme court because the contesting parties had parted
with their interest in the property, rendering the issues moot.
150. Florida Palm-Aire Corp. v. Delvin, 230 So.2d 26, 27 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
151. 247 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
152. This section provides that no regulation or restriction can become effective until
after there is a public hearing.
153. 237 So.2d 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
154. 227 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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3. RIGHTS OF SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST
In a case decided by the District Court of Appeal, Third District, a
purchaser of a parcel of land attempted to continue reclassification pro-
ceedings which were initiated by the seller six months prior to the sale. The
court held'55 that an action involving a change in zoning was in rem.
Therefore, the purchaser, being an aggrieved person," 6 had standing to
continue the proceedings. On the other hand, in another case litigated in
the same district,' 17 the owner's application for special exception and
special permit was denied on the ground that the matter was res judicata
in that the owner's predecessor in interest had been denied a prior applica-
tion.
C. Unconstitutionality
In Saar v. Town of Davie,'5" a local zoning ordinance prohibiting the
construction of gas stations within designated distances from churches,
playgrounds, schools, or hospitals was declared unconstitutional by a
federal district court. The court felt that the absence of a reciprocal
ordinance that would prohibit the construction of churches and schools
within similar designated distances from gas stations dictated a determina-
tion that the law was arbitrary and unreasonable. This "indefensible con-
tradiction" and others compelled the court to impose a permanent injunc-
tion against the town.'59
VII. TAXES
A. Exemptions
In a case decided under the Florida Constitution of 1885, the supreme
court held that it was not necessary that a municipality possess title to
property in fee simple to obtain an exemption from ad valorem taxes, as
long as the property was used exclusively for public purposes. 6 ° The
property involved in the case was a privately owned street and bridge
which was leased to the municipality and used by the public. The court
affirmed the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Second District,'
that it is the use, and not ownership, that determines if a tax exemption is
proper. However, in dicta, the supreme court stated that the changes in
the new constitution appear to impose a requirement that the property
155. Wollard v. Metropolitan Dade County, 234 So.2d 719 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
156. The court determined that the purchasers were aggrieved persons within the mean-
ing of FLA. STAT. § 176.16 (1969), which provides for review of zoning decisions.
157. Metropolitan Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So.2d
41 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
158. 308 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
159. Id. The court also found that two variances had been granted and that there
was no showing of an extraordinary situation. It also determined that spatial limitations
between gas stations, also a part of the ordinance, were not based on safety factors.
160. Overstreet v. Indian Creek Village, 248 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1971).
161. 239 So.2d 149 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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must both be owned by the municipality and used for public purposes in
order to obtain an exemption.' 62 This opinion was based on the change in
constitutional language from "be held and used exclusively"' 63 to "owned
by a municipality and used exclusively by it.'
1 6 4
Orlando Utilities Commission v. Milligan165 also involved municipal
tax exemptions, but the determination centered around the type of use of
the property. The court indicated that the exemption would not be granted
unless the land was used "exclusively" for municipal purposes, and the
property in that case was owned by a public utility and used as a recrea-
tional area for its employees and their families. The court found no
element of public or municipal purpose in the use of the property and
held that the property was not entitled to an exempt status. 66
The Supreme Court of Florida was confronted with a federal con-
stitutional question in Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida,
Inc. 67 The case involved a state statute which provided that properties
used as homes for the aged were exempt from taxation. 68 The particular
home in this case was affiliated with a religious institution, and the taxing
authorities denied an exemption on the basis that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. They claimed that the statute violated the establishment and
free exercise clauses of the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and similar clauses in the Florida Constitution in its application to
the present facts. On review, the supreme court held that although a state
cannot enact legislation that will aid one religion or all religions, it can
provide for the promotion of the general welfare of society, even though
religious interests may be indirectly benefited. 69 This statute allows for an
exemption for any bona fide home for the aged, and it therefore neither
establishes religion nor supports any or all religions.1
70
B. Assessments
There was considerable litigation during this biennium concerning
the interpretation of the phrase, "substantially completed," contained in
Florida Statutes section 193.11(4) (1967) which provides for the assess-
ment of new construction. The controversy ultimately was laid before the
bar of the Supreme Court of Florida in Markham v. Sherwood Park Ltd. 1
The court held that property would be taxed as unimproved unless con-
struction was completed to a point where it could be used for the purposes
162. Overstreet v. Indian Creek Village, 248 So.2d 2, 4 (Fla. 1971).
163. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 16 (1885).
164. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1968).
165. 229 So.2d 262 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969), cert. denied, 237 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1970).
166. Id.
167. 239 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1970).
168. FLA. STAT. § 192.06(14) (1967), transferred to FLA. STAT. 196.191(14) (1969) by
Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-55.
169. Johnson v. Presbyterian Home of Synod of Florida, Inc., 239 So.2d 256, 261 (Fla.
1970).
170. Id.
171. 244 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1971).
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intended. The court affirmed the ruling of the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District,172 which had held that formulas using percentage esti-
mates of completion do not satisfy the statutory requirements. As a result,
the fact that a building is almost completed is not necessarily sufficient.
Rather, before a new building may be assessed, it must have reached the
point where it can be used for the purposes intended. 3
Haines v. Holley174 involved a tax assessment which was considerably
in excess of the sale price received for the home during the taxable year.
The court held that the tax assessor was correct in valuing the property
for ad valorem taxes as of January 1. The actual selling price in a sub-
sequent bona fide sale is not controlling on the tax assessor, and even if
considered by him, is not the sole criterion in determining a just valua-
tion. 5
In another case, the year's taxes were assessed on a property under
construction and were paid based on the assessment. A successor tax as-
sessor attempted to reassess the property, including the improvements, for
a considerably higher amount. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that the taxes could not be back-assessed since the original
tax had been paid, and there was no showing of fraud or illegality on the
part of the previous assessor. On the other hand, Mills v. Korach7  held
that where an assessor valued the land and the improvements separately,
and due to a clerical error only the land valuation was used, a back as-
sessment would be allowed, and it did not constitute double taxation. The
omitted valuation of the improvements constituted an escape from taxa-




Since 1957, agricultural lands have been afforded special tax treat-
ment.'7 During this biennium there was much discussion as to when land
should be classified agricultural, thus according more favorable tax assess-
ments. In Walden v. Borden Co.,'8 0 the supreme court stated that land
must be "exclusively"' 8' or "primarily"' 82 used for agricultural purposes
172. Markham v. Sherwood Park, Ltd., 234 So.2d 702 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
173. Of course, this will be a factual determination in each particular case. In Culbert-
son v. Seacoast Towers East, Inc., 232 So.2d 753 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), the court based its
decision on the fact that the highrise apartment house had already been extensively oc-
cupied. Therefore, the court considered it substantially completed even though there was
some work remaining to be done.
174. 234 So.2d 152 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 238 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1970).
175. Id.
176. Markham v. Friedland, 245 So.2d 645 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
177. 249 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
178. Id. at 769.
179. FLA. STAT. § 193.11(3) (1963), discussed in Boyer, Real Property Law, 1963-65
Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MIAmi L. REv. 313, 346-47 (1965).
180. 235 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1970).
181. FLA. STAT. § 193.201 (1967), transferred to FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1969) by Fla.
Laws 1969, ch. 69-55.
182. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1969).
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to be classified as such. In Walden, an incidental agricultural use by a
lessee did not bring land used by the owner for phosphate operations
within the statute. 83 The court seemed to indicate that dual use of land
would probably defeat the classification, and that the agricultural use had
to be the only use.
Three cases decided by The District Court of Appeal, First District,
involved the question of when timberland should be classified as agricul-
tural. In the first case, Sapp v. Conrad,'84 the court held that a bona fide
forestry operation was present on lands which were used for active timber
and turpentine operations by the previous owner. The fact that the present
owners were not using the best and most economical forestry practices did
not necessitate loss of the classification. In the second case, Oates v.
Bailey,"5 the court followed Sapp, fortifying the position that the absence
of clearing, thinning, cultivation, or controlled burning did not necessarily
destroy an agricultural classification. However, in the third case,"8 " a
seemingly inconsistent result was achieved. There, the First District up-
held the trial court's finding that there was no bona fide forestry operation
because there was no management program or actual forestry operations
being conducted.8 7 The apparent distinction between this case and the two
previous cases was a factual one of degree.
D. Miscellaneous
Rasberry v. Dickson 8 held that the amount of the documentary
stamp tax required on a conveyance of property is to be computed on the
full consideration paid. The value of assumed outstanding liens or mort-
gages is not to be deducted as is done for the computation of the surtax. 9
This rule was expanded in Kendall House Apartments, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue'9" to include the value of any mortgages not expressly assumed
by the purchaser in the total consideration figure. Thus, although the
grantee does not assume a mortgage, but rather takes subject to it, the value
of the mortgage is still included for documentary stamp tax purposes.
The valuation of parking areas can be a substantial factor in the
total assessment of a shopping center. In Homer v. Dadeland Shopping
Center, Inc., 1' the owner of the center contested the tax assessor's valua-
tion of the parking lots as equal to that of the improvements on a per
183. Walden v. Borden Co., 235 So.2d 300, 302 (Fla. 1970).
184. 240 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
185. 241 So.2d 730 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d
665 (Fla. 1971).
186. St. Joe Paper Co. v. Mickler, 241 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
187. Id. at 417. Subsequent to the period covered by this survey, the supreme court
decided Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1971). There, all three cases were dis-
cussed, and the court listed ten criteria to be employed to determine whether an agricultural
classification should be granted. See Note, 26 U. Mwi~ L. REv. 000 (1971).
188. 243 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
189. Id. at 238.
190. 245 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1971).
191. 229 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1969).
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foot basis. The appellate court'92 held that the lessee's right to have a
parking area provided by the lessor for the use of customers and employees
was a restrictive covenant and detracted from the value of the property.
On certiorari,193 the supreme court reversed. It found that the obligation
to provide parking created an easement, an inherently legal interest in
land, that must be included in the assessment valuation. According to that
court, the parking area is an integral part of a unified complex of stores
and may justifiably be valued equivalently to the stores themselves.
94
The question of interest levies arises where a taxpayer is held liable
for taxes which he has unsuccessfully contested, and finds himself in
a position where he has paid part, but not all of the taxes due. In these
situations, a problem arises as to the proper rate of interest to be charged
the taxpayer on the difference between the sum tendered and the judicially
determined amount due. In litigation involving the construction of general
legislation'9 5 relating to delinquent taxes, the supreme court held that the
rate of interest for the first year of such delinquent payments was a
mandatory eighteen percent. However, it was held that a court had the
power to reduce the penalty if the taxpayer acted in good faith in cal-
culating and paying the amount due.'96 This problem is now moot (except
as to pending litigation) since a statute was passed which imposes an in-
terest charge of six percent on unpaid taxes arising out of contested as-
sessments. 97
VIII. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
A. Specific Performance
Radabaugh v. Ware'98 held that a contract for the sale of homestead
property in which the sellers' signatures were not attested by two sub-
scribing witnesses did not create obligations between the parties. There-
fore, no action would lie for specific performance or for damages for its
breach. The court based its decision on an implied requirement of wit-
nesses because of the conveyancing statute' 9  and a 1957 supreme court
decision.200 Subsequently, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in
192. 217 So.2d 844 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
193. Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Center, Inc., 229 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1969).
194. Id. at 836-37.
195. FLA. STAT. § 193.51(1) (1967), transferred to FLA. STAT. § 197.081 (1969) by Fla.
Laws 1969, ch. 69-55. At the time the suits arose, this statute, imposing an interest charge
of eighteen percent for the first year of delinquency, was the only legislation directly relat-
ing to the question.
196. Universal American Realty Corp. v. Dade County, 232 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1970), rev'g
in part, 227 So.2d 317 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Adler-Built Indus., Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, 231 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1970).
197. FLA. STAT. § 194.192 (1969), added by Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-140, which amended
and transferred provisions of FLA. STAT. § 196.01 (1967) and other taxing statutes, particu-
larly those relating to assessment contests.
198. 241 So.2d 738 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Radabaugh].
199. FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1969).
200. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1957).
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Kroner v. Esteves, 01 recognizing a possible conflict with Radabaug,2 °2
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the vendors where there had
only been one subscribing witness to the instrument. The court indicated,
however, that if the homestead character of the property had been clear
on the record, the summary judgment would have been sustained."'
Another requirement necessary to sustain an action for specific per-
formance was reaffirmed in Tumulty v. Severdija.2 °* It was held in that
case that a plaintiff seeking to enforce a contract for the sale of real
property must prove the contract by competent and satisfactory proof,
which must be clear, definite, and certain.20 5 In Tumulty, the contract was
too indefinite, and the court refused to make a new contract for the
parties.
Ferrer v. Sanchez206 held that service by publication against a non-
resident vendor is permissible in an action for specific performance in
accordance with Florida Statutes section 49.011 (1969)."7
B. Actions for Rescission and Cancellation
There are many suits involving an attempt by one party to a deposit
receipt to rescind the contract on the basis of misrepresentation. The out-
come of each case usually depends on the factual situation. In Gonzalez
v. Patane,°s the court refused to allow the purchaser of a piece of property
to rescind his deposit receipt contract or recover his deposit because a
broker had allegedly estimated the property taxes to be $300 less than
they actually were. The court observed that the tax information was
readily available to the purchaser as a matter of public record, and that
the purchaser had made no effort to obtain it. On the other hand, an as-
signee of a purchase and sale contract was permitted to rescind the as-
signment on the basis that the return on investment was considerably less
than that represented.0 9 The transaction had already closed with the
seller, but a return to the status quo was still effected by substituting the
assignor for the assignee in the purchase.
Popwell v. Abe 210 reaffirmed the Florida position that damages for
a breach by the vendee of contract to purchase land should be measured
by the difference between the value on the date of breach and on the date
of sale. Furthermore, the seller may also obtain damages contemplated
201. 245 So.2d 141 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
202. The rationale of Radabaugh, supra note 198, is broad enough to encompass all con-
tracts for the sale of realty.
203. Kroner v. Esteves, 245 So.2d 141, 142 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
204. 233 So.2d 837 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Tumulty].
205. Id.
206. 247 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
207. Although the statute does not expressly provide for specific performance actions,
the court felt that the language sufficiently covered such an action.
208. 234 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
209. Cohen v. Landow, 242 So.2d 801 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
210. 226 So.2d 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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by the parties that are natural and proximate."' The court in Satchell v.
Van Brode2. 2 also reaffirmed a well settled rule that a purchaser will not
be entitled to recover his deposit in the event of his own default in the
absence of a liquidated damages provision.
In Stener v. Glevis,21 3 the purchaser sought to cancel the deposit re-
ceipt and recover his deposit, contending that a race restriction common to
the whole subdivision made the seller's title neither marketable nor in-
surable. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the
restriction was void and could not constitute an exception to title. In ad-
dition, it was observed that title insurance was available.
C. Deeds
Videon v. Cowart 14 considered the effectiveness of a donative condi-
tional delivery of a deed to a third person. In that case, the grantor de-
livered a deed to his wife, who was to hold it until their son requested it.
The son would then hold it until the daughter grantee would renounce all
claim to the grantor's estate, at which time delivery would be made to her.
The court held that the condition was in the sole control of the grantee,
and therefore, delivery to the wife was effective. 5 The court upheld the
deed on the grounds that the grantor had no power to retake, repossess, or
exercise control over it.216
A landowner is not entitled to compensation for an interest in an abut-
ting street in a condemnation proceeding if he would not have been so
entitled in a sale to a bona fide purchaser.21 7 Furthermore, any interest
which one may have in an abutting street will automatically pass in a
deed that refers to the property by lot and block from a recorded plat.218
D. Marketable Record Title Act
No major litigation occurred in this area during the biennium except
for two cases which have been discussed in a previous survey of Florida
property law.219 One of the cases, Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc.,22 ° which
held that a root of title derived from a forged or wild deed will operate
to give one a good title as long as the strict requirements of the act are
met, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida.22' In a later case,
Wilson v. Kelley,222 a quitclaim deed was held not to constitute a root of
title.
211. Id. at 422.
212. 248 So.2d 245 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
213. 243 So.2d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
214. 241 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), cert. denied, 245 So.2d 88 (Fla. 1971).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 435-36.
217. Langston v. City of Miami Beach, 242 So.2d 481 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
218. Id. at 483.
219. Dresnick, Real Property Law, 1967-69 Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 578, 614-15 (1970).
220. 224 So.2d 743 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
221. 236 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970).
222. 226 So.2d 123 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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IX. MECHANICS' AND SIMILAR LIENS
A. Mechanics' Liens
The liability of a lessor for a mechanics' lien, when his lessee makes
improvements on the land, is specifically controlled by statute.22 ' The lien
will operate against a lessor if there is an agreement between him and the
lessee that the improvements are to be made. 24 The court in Jenkins v.
Graham225 ruled that the installation of a toilet facility for the lessee's
public amusement center was clearly contemplated by both parties. There-
fore, the contractor's lien extended to the fee simple interest of the land-
lord. In contrast, Surf Developers, Inc. v. H. E. Nason, Inc.22 ' held that
the legal owner would not be liable to repairmen for work done at the re-
quest of the purchaser under an agreement for deed. The court stated that
the owner had no knowledge of the improvements which were neither
expressly nor impliedly anticipated by the parties in their agreement for
deed.227
In a case decided under a 1963 law,22s an owner was not allowed to
offset the contract price by the cost of completion when a subcontractor
filed a lien after the contractor abandoned the project.229 The offset was
prohibited since the owner failed to properly file a notice of abandonment,
and therefore was not entitled to an offset against any lienor other than
the contractor.2 o Because of subsequent legislation, the result in this case
may no longer be the same. 3' A similar suit, Bill Adler, Inc. v. Maule In-
dustries, Inc.,2 involved a lien by a subcontractor entered after the
abandonment of a project by a general contractor. The court held that
improper payments by the owner to the general contractor were de-
trimental to the subcontractor's claim of lien. Consequently, the improper
payments were not permitted to reduce the liability of the owner and act
as a set off.2"'
B. Mechanics' Liens-Conditions
There have been numerous cases interpreting various aspects of the
Florida Mechanics' Lien Law.234 For example, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held in Art Berman Concrete, Inc. v. Sey Construc-
223. FLA. STAT. § 713.10 (1969).
224. FLA. STAT. § 713.10 (1969).
225. 237 So.2d 330 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
226. 233 So.2d 412 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
227. Id. at 413.
228. FLA. STAT. § 84.071(4) (1963).
229. Melnick v. Reynolds Metals Co., 230 So.2d 490 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
230. Id. at 491.
231. FLA. STAT. § 713.07(4) (1969). This statute no longer requires the owner to file
a notice of default or abandonment. Rather, the owner is given two methods of proceeding
when construction ceases before completion. Under one of these methods, he is required to
file a notice of intention to recommence.
232. 230 So.2d 182 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
233. Id.
234. FLA. STAT. §§ 713.01-.36 (1969).
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tion Co.235 that the statute requiring a contractor to give five days notice
before instituting a suit236 does not apply to a subcontractor. With respect
to notice of service to an owner, which must be accomplished within forty-
five days,237 another case held that the notice becomes effective when
received and not when mailed.23 Furthermore, if the last day falls on a
Sunday, receipt on the forty-sixth day will be considered timely. 39
In the absence of an adverse effect on the defendant-owner, an error
in the lienor's name on the claim of lien will not destroy substantial
compliance with the statute.24" For example, in one case, the names were
similar enough so that the owner was aware of who the claimant actually
was in the lien.241 Another case held that an affidavit containing positive
statements of fact would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement that full
performance be substantiated by affidavits based on personal knowledge.242
C. Equitable Liens
Goldberg v. Banner Supply Co.243 followed the recent supreme court
case of Crane Co. v. Fine244 which held that a materialman is not auto-
matically barred from asserting an equitable lien if he loses on his
mechanics' lien action. However, in the instant case, the supplier was not
entitled to an equitable lien because he failed to show that his claim had
special and peculiar equities.245 In Imler Earthmovers, Inc. v. Schatten,4 6
the District Court of Appeal, First District, also followed the principles of
the Crane case, but found that if the alleged facts were proven, the lienor
might have a right to an equitable lien. There, the defendant owner caused
the lienor to fail to comply with the Mechanics' Lien Law, and therefore,
the granting of the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was error,
and the case should have proceeded to a determination of the facts.247
X. CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES
A. Case Law
In an attempt to quiet title to a swimming pool area of a condominium,
the condominium association instituted a class action on behalf of the
235. 247 So.2d 791 (Fla. 3d. Dist. 1971).
236. FLA. STAT. § 713.06(3)(d) (1969).
237. See FLA. STAT. § 713.06 (1969).
238. Daly Aluminum Products, Inc. v. Stockslager, 244 So.2d 528 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970),
cert. denied, 246 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1971).
239. Id.
240. George J. Motz Constr. Corp. v. Coral Pines, Inc., 232 So.2d 441 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970).
241. Id.
242. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Dora-Stress, Inc., 243 So.2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
243. 230 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
244. 221 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1969), discussed in Dresnick, Real Property Law, 1967-69 Survey
of Florida Law, 24 U. MIAM- L. REv. 578, 597 (1970).
245. Goldberg v. Banner Supply Co., 230 So.2d 714, 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
246. 240 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
247. Id.
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owners of the condominium units. The court, in Hendler v. Rogers House
Condominium, Inc.,24 ruled that the association did not allege facts
sufficient to show that it was a proper party to bring a class action. Its
interest was not coextensive with that of the owners of individual units,
and no explicit provision of the declaration of condominium providing for
the authority to maintain a class suit had been attached to or recited in
the complaint.
In another case, an agreement between apartment owners provided
for a right of first refusal in the remaining owners when any owner
desired to sell his apartment. After notification of the defendant's proposal
to sell, the plaintiff exercised her right to buy. However, the defendant
refused to sell the apartment to her. The court held that in order for the
plaintiff to be entitled to her preemptive right, it was not necessary that





Legislation designed to protect buyers of cooperative and condomin-
ium units was enacted in 1970.2"' Three areas of possible abuse covered by
the new laws are: maintenance or management contracts, disclosure before
sale, and deposits in connection with unit purchases.
2. MAINTENANCE, MANAGEMENT OR OPERATION CONTRACTS
Provisions of the Florida Statutes provide that any initial or original
contract by a cooperative or condominium association is subject to can-
cellation at any time after the individual unit owners assume control of
their association, 251' but a concurrence of 75 percent of the individual unit
owners is required for cancellation.2"2 In cases of multiphase projects,
original maintenance and similar contracts as for individual buildings may
be cancelled by 75 percent of the individual unit owners in residence when-
ever control is acquired by the unit owners. However, contracts relating to
the entire project, including recreational areas, may not be cancelled under
such provisions until the last association or corporation in the entire
project comes under the control of the individual unit owners.2 3 These
statutes were obviously designed to provide relief from unconscionable
contracts entered into or negotiated by a developer before the sale of
individual units.
248. 234 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
249. Victor v. Sill, 243 So.2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
250. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-135, adding FLA. STAT. §§ 711.30-.32 (Supp. 1970) as to
cooperatives; and Fla. Laws 70-274, adding FLA. STAT. §§ 711.13(4), 711.24-.25 (Supp. 1970)
as to condominiums.
251. FLA. STAT. § 711.13(4) (Supp. 1970), as amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-277 as
to condominiums; and FLA. STAT. § 711.30 (Supp. 1970) as to cooperatives.
252. See authorities cited in note 251 supra.
253. See authorities cited in note 251 supra.
1971]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
3. FULL DISCLOSURE BEFORE SALE
Prior to the initial sale or offering for sale of any cooperative or con-
dominium unit, the seller or developer or his agent must make full dis-
closure of items bearing on the rights and obligations of the purchaser and
costs of operation. Specifically included in the items to be disclosed in
the case of condominiums are the following:
2 4
(a) copy of the declaration;
(b) copy of the articles of incorporation or charter of associa-
tion;
(c) copy of the by-laws of the association;
(d) copy of the underlying ground lease or similar document,
if any;
(e) copy of the management or maintenance contract, if any,
which shall specify the services to be rendered and the
charges to be made;
(f) copy of the projected operating budget for the unit to be
sold; and
(g) copy of the sales brochure and a floor plan of the apartment,
including information on recreational, parking and other
common areas.
Such disclosures are required to be made prior to the execution of the
contract for sale. Thereafter, no changes shall be made which materially
affect the rights of the buyer without obtaining his approval. If all of the
above information is not available at the time of execution, the contract
shall provide that it is voidable at the option of the buyer at any time
within fifteen days after the last item of required information is furnished.
Such information is required to be furnished no later than ninety days
prior to the closing of the sale. Failure to comply on behalf of the seller or
his agents authorizes the buyer to rescind at any time prior to closing.255
In the case of cooperatives, the requirements are essentially the same,
except that the first document will be a proprietary lease or other instru-
ment by which the purchaser will acquire the right to use and occupy a
unit.250
4. DEPOSITS
Whenever a deposit is made in connection with a purchase contract,
prior to the filing of a notice of commencement pursuant to the Mechanics'
Lien Law, it is now required that such money be deposited in a special
escrow account, and commingling with other funds is forbidden.257 After
254. FLA. STAT. § 711.24 (Supp. 1970). An amendment in 1971 limits the operation of
the statute to the initial sale or offering for sale. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-277.
255. FLA. STAT. § 711.24 (Supp. 1970), as amended by Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-277.
256. FLA. STAT. § 711.31 (Supp. 1970). The operation of this statute is not limited to the
first sale or offering.
257. FLA. STAT. § 711.25 (Supp. 1970) as to condominiums; FLA. STAT. § 711.32 (Supp.
1970) as to cooperatives.
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notice of commencement is filed, the developer may use such advance
deposits for the actual construction and development of the property if
the contract of sale so provides. None of the funds, however, may be used
for salaries, commissions or expenses of salesmen, or for advertising.
Further, to permit such deposits to be used for construction purposes, the
right to do so must be clearly printed or stamped in bold face on the face
of the contract and immediately above the place of the buyer's signature.
Failure to comply with these provisions renders the contract voidable,
and the buyer then acquires the right to recover his deposit with interest.
Further, use by the developer of any of the advance funds for purposes
other than as provided, with the intent to defraud, constitutes embezzle-
ment.
2 51
258. See authorities cited in note 257 supra.
